Air France Flight 358

Air France Flight 358, a flight from Paris, France, to Toronto, Canada, using an Airbus A340 airliner, departed Paris without incident at 11:53 UTC 2 August 2005, later touching down on runway 24L at Toronto Pearson International Airport at 20:01 UTC (16:01 EDT). The aircraft failed to stop on the runway and plunged into the nearby Etobicoke Creek, coming to rest and bursting into flames approximately 300 metres past the end of the runway. The Airbus A340-300 had 309 people aboard, 297 passengers (two of them infants, without seat) and 12 crew, all of whom survived with only 12 sustaining serious injuries. The accident highlighted the role played by highly-trained flight attendants during an emergency situation.

Due to poor weather many flights departing and arriving at Pearson were cancelled, and many subsequent flights to Toronto Pearson were diverted to other Canadian airports in Ottawa, London, Hamilton and Winnipeg, and most of the larger aircraft were diverted to Montreal, as well as Syracuse, New York, and Buffalo, New York. Flights from Vancouver were turned back. Some 540 flights were cancelled.

The crash of Air France Flight 358 was the biggest crisis to hit Toronto Pearson since the airport's involvement in Operation Yellow Ribbon.

Jean Lapierre, the Canadian Minister of Transport, referred to Flight 358 as a "miracle" because all of the passengers survived. Other press sources described the accident as the "Miracle in Toronto", the "Toronto Miracle", the "Miracle" Escape, and the Miracle of Runway 24L".

Aircraft
The aircraft operating Flight 358 was a 295-seat Airbus A340-313X powered by four CFM International CFM56 engines. With Manufacturers Serial Number 289 and registration F-GLZQ it was first flown on 3 August 1999 and delivered to Air France on 7 September 1999. On this flight, it was flown by Captain Alain Rosaye, 57, and First Officer Frédéric Naud, 43.

Passengers
Out of the 297 passengers, there were 168 adult males, 118 adult females, 8 children and 3 infants. Among them, 3 passengers were seated in crew seats, one in the third occupant seat of the flight deck and two in the flight crew rest area. Also among the passengers were 3 wheelchair passengers and 1 blind passenger. The passengers consisted of businesspersons, vacationers and students.

Accident
The accident occurred on 2 August 2005 20:03 UTC (16:03 EDT). Air France Flight 358, an Airbus A340-313X with 297 passengers and 12 crew, overshot the end of runway 24L at Toronto Pearson International Airport (in Mississauga, Ontario) and came to rest in a small ravine 300 metres past the end of the runway. All passengers and crew evacuated successfully. Twelve major injuries and no fatalities resulted from the accident. The rest suffered minor or no injuries. A post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft.

The flight landed during reports of exceptionally bad weather — severe winds, heavy rain, and localized thunderstorms near the airport (see weather, below) — and touched down further along the runway than usual. Some passengers report that the plane was rocking from side to side before landing, possibly due to turbulence and gusting winds associated with the storm systems. One passenger described the crash as like a "car accident, but it keeps going and going, non-stop."

The plane was cleared to land at 16:04 EDT on Runway 24L, which at 9,000 feet (2,700 m) in length is the shortest runway at Pearson Airport. After touchdown, the aircraft did not stop before the end of the runway, but continued for 300 metres until it slid into the Etobicoke Creek ravine, on the western edge of the airport near the interchange of Dixie Road and Highway 401.

After coming to rest, fire was noticed outside the aircraft, and an evacuation order was given. The two rear left exits remained closed due to the fire. On opening the emergency exits, one of the right middle exit slides (R3) deflated after being punctured by debris from the aircraft, while one of the left slides (L2) failed to deploy at all for unknown reasons. A number of passengers were forced to jump from the aircraft to exit. The actions of the flight attendants, who ensured that all of the passengers quickly evacuated, contributed to the safe escape of all passengers. The first officer was the last to leave the plane, which was evacuated within the required 90 second time frame.

Emergency response teams responded to the incident and were on site within 52 seconds of the crash occurring. The TSB official report states that "the first response vehicle arrived at the scene within one minute of the crash alarm sounding".

After the crash some passengers, including those who were injured, scrambled up the ravine to Highway 401 which runs almost parallel to the runway. Peel Regional Police located the first officer and several passengers along Highway 401, receiving assistance from motorists who were passing the airport when the crash occurred. Some motorists took injured people, including the pilot, directly to hospitals. Other motorists took non-injured passengers to the airport. The main fire burned for two hours, ending just before 18:00 EDT. All fires were out by early afternoon 3 August 2005, and investigators were able to begin their work.

The accident caused the cancellation or diversion of hundreds of flights, with ripple effects throughout the North American air traffic system. By that night, four of the five runway surfaces were back in service, but the flight (and passenger) backlog continued through the next day.

The accident also snarled traffic throughout Toronto's highway system. Highway 401, one of the world's busiest highways, is the main route through the Greater Toronto Area, and the crash occurred near the highway's widest point where 18 lanes of traffic travel between Highway 403, Highway 410 and Highway 427. Though the fire was extinguished within hours, there was considerable congestion on the highway for days after the crash, due to motorists slowing down or even pulling over to get a look at the wreckage. Traffic flow was slowed due to numerous traffic collisions, prompting the Ontario Provincial Police to increase patrols along that stretch.

In 1978, Air Canada Flight 189 slid into Etobicoke Creek, the site of the AF358 crash, resulting in two deaths. The Air Canada DC-9 used the 24R-06L runway, crashing north of the AF358 crash scene and deeper into the ravine. The runway the Air France plane landed on, 24L-06R, is an east-west runway with a length of 2.7 kilometres (9,000 feet), so the plane did not land very far off the runway. After the crash of AF358, there were some calls for the ravine to be filled or spanned by a bridge. Others said that such an undertaking would have been prohibitively expensive. (Note: At the time of the crash of Air Canada Flight 189 the runway used by Air France 358 did not yet exist, and runway 24R-06L was numbered 24L-06R. The current runway 23-05 was at that time numbered 24R-06L)

This was the first time an Airbus A340 series was involved in a crash, ending its 14-year clean record. The plane entered service in 1999 and had its last maintenance check done in France on 5 July 2005. The plane made 3,711 flights for a total of 28,418 flight hours.

One passenger took four photographs of the evacuation with his camera, which were released to the media. The final Transportation Safety Board of Canada report refers to the photographs and draws conclusions about the nature of the disaster based on the photographs. Mark Rosenker, the acting chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, criticized the concept of passengers taking photographs of disasters, stating, "Your business is to get off the airplane. Your business is to help anybody who needs help." Therefore, according to Rosenker, taking photographs during an evacuation of an airliner is "irresponsible". Helen Muir, an aerospace psychology professor at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom, stated that pausing during evacuations "is just what we don't want people to do." Muir added that photographs are "very valuable to accident investigators".

Weather
A METAR (weather observation) for the Pearson Airport was released almost exactly at the time of the accident. It stated that the weather at 20:04 UTC (16:04 EDT) consisted of winds from 340° true (north-northwest) at 24 kn (44 km/h) gusting to 33 kn (61 km/h), with 1+1⁄4 miles (2.0 km) visibility in heavy thunderstorms and rain. The ceiling was overcast at 4,500 feet (1,400 m) above ground level with towering cumulus cloud. The temperature was 23 °C (73 °F). According to the Canada Air Pilot, runway 24L has a heading of 227° true (237° magnetic), and the minima for the ILS approach are ceiling 200 feet (61 m) above ground level and visibility 1⁄2 miles (0.80 km) or runway visual range of 2600 (RVR). The METAR for 21:00 UTC (17:00 EDT), nearly an hour after the accident, shows wind backing to the south and improving conditions generally, but includes in its remarks "FU ALF" to indicate smoke aloft from the burning plane.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that the crash occurred two hours after a ground stop was declared at the airport because of severe thunderstorms in the area ("red alert" status, which, for safety reasons, halts all ground activity on the apron and gate area. Aircraft can still land, and take off if still in queue). Visibility at the time of the accident was reported to be very poor. There was lightning, strong gusty winds, and hail at the time and the rain just began as the plane was landing. Within two hours the winds increased from 5 to 30km/h (3 to 20 mph) and the temperature dropped from 30 to 23 °C (86 to 73 °F). A severe thunderstorm warning was in effect since 11:30 a.m. and all outbound flights and ground servicing operations had been canceled but landings were still permitted.

Dramatization
This accident is also featured on The Weather Channel television program Storm Stories. An episode of Mayday (Air Crash Investigation, Air Emergency) (Season 4 Episode 1) series also features this incident.

Injuries
The following table summarizes the injuries as reported by the Transportation Safety Board.

Out of the twelve passengers who suffered major injuries, nine suffered the injuries from the impact and three suffered the injuries from the evacuation. Most of the injuries occurred to passengers and crew located in the flight deck and forward cabin.

According to passenger reports, the leap from the aircraft to the ground caused many of the injuries, including broken legs, and ruptured vertebrae. The Captain sustained back and head injuries during the impact of the crash when his seat was wrenched out of place by the force of the impact, causing him to hit his head against the overhead controls. Minor injuries included twisted ankles, sore necks, bruises and effects from smoke inhalation. A total of 33 persons were taken to various Greater Toronto Area hospitals for treatment, 21 were treated for minor injuries and released. Hospitals included:
 * Humber River Regional Hospital – Finch campus
 * The hospital treated seven people for smoke inhalation
 * William Osler Health Centre
 * Etobicoke General Hospital (Toronto)
 * Peel Memorial Hospital (Brampton)
 * Hospital for Sick Children – downtown Toronto
 * The hospital treated a nine month-old baby for smoke inhalation.
 * Credit Valley Hospital – Mississauga

At the crash site were a number of emergency services:


 * Greater Toronto Airport Authority Emergencies Services – on-site with six airport tenders
 * Peel Regional Paramedic Services – on-site
 * Peel Regional Police – on-site
 * Mississauga Fire and Emergency Services – on-site
 * Toronto EMS – on-site
 * Royal Canadian Mounted Police – on-site
 * Ontario Provincial Police – on Highway 401
 * Toronto Transit Commission – two buses to transport passengers to Terminal 3

A class-action lawsuit was filed approximately a week after the crash in Ontario Superior Court of Justice; the lawsuit seeks C$269 million in damages for trauma, any future medical expenses, and loss of property and earnings.

Representation
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) took control of the accident site once emergency response teams had finished their work. The TSB led the investigation, with the cooperation of several other organizations:


 * Transport Canada – Ministerial observer for Minister of Transport
 * French Department of Transport
 * Airbus
 * Air France
 * GE-Aviation
 * United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

International protocol regarding the investigation of civil aviation accidents mandates that representatives from the manufacturer's nation participate. As GE-Aviation is headquartered in Evendale, Ohio, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada invited representatives from the NTSB to assist in the investigation.

Evidence
The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were sent to France for analysis. Preliminary results indicate that the plane landed 1,220 metres (4,000 ft) from the start of the 2,743 metres (9,000 ft) runway (much further along than normal) at a ground speed of 148 knots (274 km/h; 170 mph) – 140 knots being considered normal – with a tailwind, skidded down the runway and was traveling over 70 knots (130 km/h; 81 mph) as it overran the tarmac and fell into the ravine. Tire marks extend 1,600 ft (490 m) indicating emergency braking action.

Réal Levasseur, the TSB's lead investigator for the accident, said the plane landed too far down the runway to have been able to stop properly on such wet pavement. Investigators have found no evidence of engine trouble, brake failure, or problems with the spoilers or thrust reversers. Why evacuation chutes failed to deploy from two exits remains under study. Some fleeing passengers were forced to jump some two metres (six feet) to the ground.

Irregularities
The final report of the TSB investigation can be found at the TSB website here (PDF document). The TSB update states: "During the flare, the aircraft entered a heavy shower area, and the crew's forward visibility was significantly reduced as they entered the downpour." This suggests the possibility that the plane was hit in heavy weather by a wet downburst, causing the Airbus to land long. Based on the Air France A340-313 Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), page 34G, "Landing Distance Without Autobrake", the minimum distance of 1,155 m (3,789 ft) would be used in dry conditions to bring the aircraft to a complete stop. In wet conditions the braking distance increases with a 5-knot tailwind, reversers operative, and a 6.3 mm (0.25 in) of downpour on the runway to 2,016 m (6,614 ft). This runway length was obviously not available at touch down of AF 358.

Other possible irregularities mentioned in a government report on the accident:
 * Passenger oxygen tanks supposedly exploded in the heat of the fire. (Emergency passenger oxygen is provided via a chemical oxygen generator but the aircraft would have been carrying therapeutic oxygen for passengers requiring a constant supply throughout the flight and first aid situations.)
 * The copy of the "E.R.S. Aircraft Crash Chart" at Pearson International Airport did not include blueprints for the Airbus A340 model of planes at the time of the crash. The blueprints would have contained vital information with regards to search and rescue efforts, and provide the location of fuel and pressurised gas tanks so that rescue crews can avoid them.

Conclusions
The TSB concluded in their final report that the pilots had missed cues that would have prompted them to review their decision to land. In their report the TSB cited that
 * Air France had no procedures related to distance required from thunderstorms during approaches and landings
 * After the autopilot had been disengaged, the pilot flying increased engine thrust in reaction to a decrease in airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking (spatial disorientation). The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the flight path.
 * At 300 feet above ground level, the wind changed from a headwind to a tailwind.
 * While approaching the threshold, the aircraft entered an intense downpour and the forward visibility became severely reduced.
 * When the aircraft was near the threshold, the crew members committed to the landing and believed their go-around option no longer existed.
 * The pilot not flying did not make the standard callouts concerning the spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll. This contributed to the delay in the pilot flying selecting the thrust reversers.
 * There were no landing distances indicated on the operational flight plan for a contaminated runway condition at the Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport.
 * The crew did not calculate the landing distance required for runway 24L despite aviation routine weather reports (METARs) calling for thunderstorms. The crew were not aware of the margin of error.
 * The topography at the end of the runway beyond the area and the end of Runway 24L contributed to aircraft damage and injuries to crew and passengers.

The TSB advised changes to bring Canadian runway standards in line with those used abroad, either by extending them to have a 300 m runway safety area (or Runway End Safety Area) or, where that is impossible, providing an equivalently effective backup method of stopping aircraft. Other recommendations that the TSB made includes having the Department of Transport establish clear standards limiting approaches and landings in convective weather for all operators at Canadian airports, and mandate training for all pilots involved in Canadian air operations to better enable them to make landing decisions in bad weather.

Compensation
Within one week of the crash, cash payments ranging from C$1,000 to C$3,700 (all figures in this article in Canadian dollars unless otherwise stated) were given to passengers for interim emergency use. These funds were given to passengers through an emergency centre set up in the Novotel Hotel in Mississauga, near the airport. These payments were independent of the claims process, which has been started for passengers who have not retained counsel. It is expected that the insurers of Air France will pay for all damages as well as extra compensation for having passengers go through the ordeal; however, only amounts of €6,000 to €9,000 have been offered, prompting passengers to turn to the lawsuit to seek legal action. The insurance is handled by the Societé de Gestion & D'Expertises D'Assurances in France. All passengers have also been offered a free return ticket to any Air France destination in the world in the same fare class in which they were originally booked on AF358.

Passenger class action
Within a few days after the accident, a class action suit was filed on behalf of all passengers on board by representative plaintiff Suzanne Deak to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The attorneys representing Deak and the passengers are Gary R. Will and Paul Miller from Will Barristers in Toronto. The plaintiffs are seeking payments for general and aggravated damages in the amount of $75 million, and payments for special damages and pecuniary damages in the amount of $250 million. A second class action lawsuit was also filed by plaintiffs Sahar Alqudsi and Younis Qawasmi (her husband) for $150 million a few days later. However, both suits have since merged as only one lawsuit is allowed to proceed to court.

In December 2009, a $12 million settlement agreement was reached between Air France and the class. The settlement will resolve the claims of 184 passengers and their families. Forty-five other passengers had opted out of the suit, while 68 others have already agreed to a settlement with Air France.

Air France stated that it will not lose any money from the lawsuits as it is covered by its insurers. Also, Air France did not provide further contacts and assistance to those who retained counsel of the lawsuit until an agreement has been made between both sides' lawyers.

Air France lawsuit
In June 2008, almost 3 years after the accident, Air France filed a lawsuit against the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, NAV Canada, and the Canadian Federal Government for $180 million. In the statement of claim filed with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Air France alleged that the "GTAA failed to provide a safe environment for the conduct of civil air operations." The statement also claims that "The overrun and the consequent injuries to persons and damage to property were caused solely by the negligence of the defendants". Air France says Transport Canada was "negligent" by not implementing the recommendations of a coroner's inquest into the 1978 crash that urged the creation of a 300-metre safety area to give aircraft more room to stop after landing.

Aftermath
An inquiry by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada found runway safety zones at the end of runways at some Canadian airports are below accepted international standards. The report highlighted that Toronto Pearson's runways meet current Canadian standards, and that runway 24L has a de facto 150 metre RESA. The TSB also suggested precautions are needed to be taken by airlines when landing in bad weather.

Flight 358 is no longer used on this route. The flight route designation for Air France's Paris-Toronto route is now Flight 356, still using an Airbus A340 aircraft.